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I.

INTRODUCTION
The proper role for the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) is a controversial

topic. Since at least the 1980s the IMF has attracted criticism for excessively interfering
with the economic sovereignty of developing countries.1 Following the Asian, Russian
and Argentinean financial crises in the late 1990s, prominent U.S. economists have
jumped on board, charging the IMF with pursuing policies which do not work.2 This
tension has led to a vigorous debate amongst commentators about whether reform of the
“international financial architecture” is required, and if so, how.3 Indeed, between 1997
and 2000, no less than five reports evaluating the IMF’s record were generated.4

* Associate in Law, Columbia Law School. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Appel
Conference on Foreign Direct Investment, held at Columbia Law School between March 27 and 29, 2003.
The author would like to thank Jose Alvarez, Tamara Lothian and Sol Picciotto for their thoughtful
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. All errors remain, of course, my own.
1
See, e.g., Richard Gerster, The IMF and Basic Needs Conditionality, 16 JN'L INT'L TRADE LAW 497
(1982); JOHN WILLIAMSON, IMF CONDITIONALITY (1983); and THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Robert J. Myers ed., 1987).
2
See, e.g., Dani Rodrik, How Should Structural Adjustment Programs Be Designed?, 18 WORLD DEVELP’T
933 (1990); Jeffrey Sachs, The IMF is a Power Unto Itself, speech delivered at Harvard University on
December 11, 1997, available at
<http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~nroubini/asia/AsiaCrisisSachsViewFT1297.html> (last visited March 20,
2003); Tony Killick, Principals, Agents and the Failings of Conditionality, 9 J. INT’L DEVELOP’T 483
(1997); JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); and MICHAEL MUSSA,
ARGENTINA AND THE FUND: FROM TRIUMPH TO TRAGEDY (2002).
3
See, e.g., BARRY EICHENGREEN, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE (1999);
and PETER B. KENEN, THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE (2001).
4
(1) JOSE DE GREGORIO, BARRY EICHENGREEN, TAKATOSHI ITO & CHARLES WYPLOSZ, REPORT ON AN
INDEPENDENT AND ACCOUNTABLE IMF (International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies, Geneva
and Center for Economic Policy Research, London, 1999); (2) COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT: SAFEGUARDING PROSPERITY IN A GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: THE
FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARCHITECTURE (Carla A. Hills and Peter G. Peterson, CoChairs; Morris Goldstein, Project Director, 1999); (3) Montek S. Ahluwalia, The IMF and the World Bank
in the New Financial Architecture in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL ISSUES FOR THE 1990S,

For its part, the IMF has responded to recent criticism and reformed its policies in
some key areas, such as public relations and conditionality terms for gaining access to
IMF credit. The IMF’s tone has become considerably more diplomatic and conciliatory.
One might argue that commentators should now suspend judgment and give these
changes time to take effect.
I am not so sure. This paper argues that deeper changes still are required. To this
extent, I am in the company of many of the recent IMF reports. But not necessarily for
the same reasons. I hope to bring a different perspective to the debate. Most critics have
assessed the IMF globally, from a primarily economic slant. Their main concern is
whether what the IMF does actually works. This paper focuses on the specific (but often
overlooked) intersection between the IMF and foreign investment, and takes a primarily
legal approach.5 My main concern is whether IMF conditionality is good investment
regulation.
This topic is important for two reasons. First, foreign investment is the major
driver of the world economy, already eclipsing trade in goods as a determinant of global
economics.6 But, compared to trade law, its rules are unclear.7 Examining the IMF’s
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impact helps clarify the realpolitik of investment regulation. Second, although
investment is not one of the core functions of the IMF, it is an area in which the IMF is
actively involved. This article uses investment as a prism to shed light on how the IMF
works and how it should work.
This paper is best understood as part of a larger research project.8 The empirical
part of this project will examine the nature and degree of IMF foreign investment
regulation through its conditionality policies. This paper assumes (but does not establish)
that some regulatory effect does exist and seeks to explain why this is important.9 Below,
I argue that there are significant legal, practical and institutional implications of IMF
regulation of foreign investment, which for the purposes of this paper (and as explained
in Part III) includes foreign direct investment, portfolio investment and privatization.
II.

REGULATION, CONDITIONALITY AND THE IMF
A.

Regulation by Appropriation

It may be convenient to explain what I mean by “IMF regulation”. To economists,
regulation refers to “almost any external control of business”10 and can take a variety of
forms, ranging from non-binding codes of conduct (self-regulation),11 to corrective tax
incentives,12 to domestic laws,13 to international agreements.14 Lawyers have
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traditionally adopted a narrower view, tending to think of regulation as referring to
technical rules of public law enforced by government, or semi-autonomous, agencies.15
This divergence underscores the point that different legal tools may sometimes
achieve similar economic effects. A form of regulation well-known to economists, but
perhaps less so to lawyers, is regulation by appropriation – or regulation through
conditionality on credit disbursement. This “soft” regulation is a way of influencing
indirectly what an entity may not wish, or be able, to control directly.16 Regulation by
appropriation can be seen at all levels of society. Every business which has negotiated
finance realizes the power that the bank’s loan conditions place on operations. The same
is true for individuals or organizations who receive government grants tied to specific
conduct criteria.17
Regulation by appropriation also exists on a municipal and national level,
whenever one political entity is dependent upon funding from another political entity. In
the United States, the terms of federal grants have led to much jurisprudence and
commentary on the scope of the “spending clause” in Article I, section 8, clause 1 of the
U.S. Constitution. Under this provision, the Federal Government may tax and
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appropriate funds to the several states for the “general Welfare” of the Union. But
federal grants are usually conditioned on the states implementing certain policies. In this
way, grants are used as tools for the Federal Government to seek through indirect
pressure results which it cannot command through law.18 In one notable example, after
the Supreme Court struck down a federal law banning guns in school zones,19 President
Clinton announced that he would achieve the same result indirectly through the spending
clause.20 I will return to the U.S. analogy later in this paper.
And of course regulation by appropriation exists too on an international level,
whenever funds given to a country – whether pledged by another country, a private donor
or an international organization – are conditional on performance. Obviously there will
be differences in the strength, coerciveness and effect of different donor conditions. So
terming all conditional credit disbursement soft regulation is not to make a value
judgment about its legitimacy. It is merely to use consistent taxonomy.
The IMF is a leading administrator of regulation by appropriation through its
conditionality policies. Over time, its conditions have embraced broad aspects of a
country’s legal and economic development. Even through the IMF has no specific brief
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to control foreign investment, its expansive view of its mission has led it to focus on
investment as an important engine of economic growth.21
B.

What is the IMF, and What Does it Do?

The IMF was the central achievement of the Bretton Woods conference in 1944.22
The IMF’s Articles of Agreement (the “Articles”) created, for the first time, a codified
international monetary system, designed to prevent the economic disintegration of the
interwar years. The IMF’s purposes are defined in Article I and require the IMF, among
other things, “to promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements
among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation”.23
Exchange stability was to be achieved in two ways. First, the IMF Articles
mandated a fixed (but adjustable) “par value” system of exchange rates.24 Once set, each
member was required to maintain that par value, through intervention in the market if
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necessary.25 Secondly, the IMF could lend money to members to help them deal with
temporary balance of payments deficits in a manner which (unlike, for instance, a sharp
tightening of monetary or fiscal policy) would not be “destructive of national and
international prosperity”.26 In short, the IMF’s role was to be something between an
international credit union and an international reserve bank.
Over time, the functions of the IMF have evolved. The par value system
collapsed in 1971.27 Despite attempts at revival, the international monetary system now
works on floating rates determined by market forces. The IMF has adapted by changing
its role from a provider of short-term funds under fixed exchange rates to a manager of
world financial crises and a long-term lender to developing countries.
The IMF has also developed its drawing rules. On joining the IMF, each member
is assigned a quota which determines both its contribution to and ability to draw on the
IMF General Reserve Account (“GRA”), as well as its voting rights.28 From the outset,
contributions have been paid in the proportions of one–quarter hard assets (gold, or the
IMF’s currency, Special Drawing Rights (“SDRs”)), and the remainder in members’ own
currencies.29 This first quarter, known as the “reserve tranche”, may be automatically
drawn on.30 A member may also draw up to 200% of their quota through accessing so-
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called “credit tranches” (each tranche is equivalent to 25% of quota).31 Requests to draw
on credit tranches are subject to conditions, with a relatively basic test for the first credit
tranche, but more rigorous conditions for the “upper” tranches. Over time, the IMF has
developed increasingly sophisticated conditionality policies, which are discussed in more
detail below.32
For present purposes, there are three important IMF lending mechanisms. Firstly,
the Stand-By Arrangement (“SBA”), through which most applications for GRA credit
tranches are made. This arrangement typicallylasts for 12-18 months and allows the
IMF to undertake investigations necessary to approve a loan before an acute balance of
payments difficulty arises.33 Secondly, the Extended Fund Facility (“EFF”), which
functions like a stand-by arrangement, but typically lasts for three years.34 Thirdly, the
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (“PRGF”), which is an independent credit line
provided outside the GRA. For this reason, it is not subject to many of the rules
contained in the IMF’s Articles. The PRGF is a specific mechanism for “structural
adjustment”, which can include capital market and privatization reform.35
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF IMF INVESTMENT REGULATION

31
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This paper assumes that through the three lending mechanisms above the IMF
influences international investment in some debtor countries. By this, I mean that some
instances of these facilities have been or are conditional on the debtor country enacting
policies aimed at liberalizing foreign investment.
First, some definitions. What sort of policies are directed at foreign investment?
There are three relevant policy areas: foreign direct investment (“FDI”) controls;
portfolio investment controls; and policies relating to the ownership of national resources
and infrastructure. The first two are evidently investment policies. The latter is also, but
less evidently, related to investment. This is because a key aim of privatizing public
assets is to increase the opportunity for FDI through acquisition. Even if this does not
happen initially (for instance, when shares in newly privatized corporations are
distributed to the domestic population) it is a very likely downstream consequence.
This defines investment. But what does investment “liberalization” mean?
Liberalization is a slippery term to define,36 but it essentially refers to the removal of
barriers to entry and operation. In theory, a perfectly liberalized investment regime has
three core features: (1) right to establishment: the regime would not ban, restrict,
condition or subject to approval, investment transactions; (2) national treatment: the
regime would not discriminate against foreign investors in favor of nationals;37 and (3)
privatized infrastructure: all commercially viable public assets would be transferred to
private hands and would be available for purchase by foreigners. Throughout this paper I
36

This difficulty is noted in Eichengreen, Mussa et al, supra note 21, 11.
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term the package of policies which tends towards these outcomes as the “investment
liberalization formula”.
Having assumed the IMF promotes the formula, one might ask “so what”? Does
it really matter that the IMF has a finger controlling investment? One might argue that
this is an unqualified good. After all, foreign investment is a major driver of economic
growth. By encouraging investment liberalization, the IMF is prescribing policies which
are theoretically good for debtor countries. Moreover, the IMF advocates reforms which
many inside the country want to implement, and may provide the political leverage to
permit reforms to take place. The IMF is entitled to a return on its investment and has an
obligation to lend responsibly. There is no reason to expect any type of loan without
repayment conditions.
My answer is two-fold. To start, even if IMF investment regulation is an
unqualified good, it is important to acknowledge and study its effects – and its
relationship to more traditional forms of regulation. The place of IMF conditionality in
the international investment framework is therefore the first part of my discussion in
section A below.
Second, it is far from clear that IMF investment regulation is an unqualified good.
There are three main concerns, addressed respectively in sections B through D below.
First, investment regulation is likely outside the IMF’s mandate. Second, the legitimacy
of such regulation is questionable, given its asymmetric application as between rich and
poor countries and its tension with concepts such as democracy and political
accountability. Third, for structural reasons, IMF investment regulation may simply be
ineffective. After discussing these issues, I conclude that, even if the IMF is prescribing
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the right policies,38 IMF conditionality is not the vehicle through which to implement
them.
A.

Coherence: theRelationship of IMF Conditionality to Traditional

Forms of Investment Regulation
In 1998, negotiations for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (“MAI”),
conducted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”),
ended in failure. This failure was partly due to opposition from developing countries and
non-governmental organizations.39 If successful, the MAI would have been the
investment equivalent of the GATT. As it is, the failure of the MAI underscores the lack
of consensus, even amongst OECD members, as to appropriate rules for foreign
investment and the proper balance between international investment regulation and
domestic sovereignty.
Following the MAI’s failure, there remain at least three traditional sources of
international investment law. First, there is customary international law relating to
foreign investment. In the main this is relatively rudimentary and focuses on
expropriation and compensation issues.40 Second, many states have now entered into
bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) which govern aspects of investment relationships
involving the two party states. While BITs have grown at a prolific rate,41 they have
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largely focused on post-establishment FDI only, and have not usually prescribed
substantive investment strategies.42 Third, some regional trade agreements (“RTAs”),
notably the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), include investment rules
similar to those found in BITs (although NAFTA addresses entry as well as postestablishment issues).43 The European Union, through its free trade area, has more
expansive investment rules again.44
More recently, the World Trade Organization has intervened in the investment
field. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) and the Trade-Related
Aspects of Investment Measures (“TRIMS”) both restrict the investment policies open to
WTO members.45 There are also softer legal instruments, such as the OECD Code of
Liberalization of Capital Movements, which encourage in a flexible and non-binding
manner the easing of restrictions on capital transfers.46 The chart below compares the
scope and membership of the different regulatory tools.
Regulatory Tool

Scope

Membership

TRANSNAL’L LAW 501, 503 (1998). Today, there are almost 2000. WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC
PROSPECTS 120 (2003).
42
Such as privatization or capital market liberalization. See id. at 512. See also Georgio Sacredotti,
Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments of Investment Protection, 269 RECUIL DES COURS, TOME
255 (1997). BITs generally contain post-establishment rights of national treatment, most favored nation
(“MFN”) treatment, fair and equitable treatment and compensation for expropriation. BITs also allow for
direct investor-state arbitration. Note that the U.S. Model BIT (1984) does grant entry rights subject to
sectors excluded by an Annex.
43
See NAFTA, Chapter 11. NAFTA is modeled on a BIT and guarantees national treatment (Art. 1102),
MFN treatment (Art. 1105), fair and equitable treatment (Art. 1107) and compensation for expropriation
(Art. 1110). NAFTA also allows for direct investor-state arbitration.
44
See Treaty establishing the European Community, Title III, Chapters 2 and 4, especially Article 43 (right
to establishment), Article 49 (right to trade in services without restrictions) and Article 56 (right to transfer
capital without restrictions).
45
The GATS applies to all “trade in services” which phrase is defined to include four modes of supply.
Mode 3, “supply of a service…by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the
territory of any other Member” encompasses many forms of FDI: GATS, I(2)(c). The GATS has specific
application to financial services. See GATS, Annex on Financial Services, Art. 5. The TRIMS essentially
clarifies obligations existing in the GATT: See TRIMS, 2 and Annex.
46
Another such instrument is the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”) Non-Binding Investment
Principles.
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Customary International Law

Addresses:
Expropriation/compensation; and
fair and equitable treatment
(post establishment)

International community

BITs

Addresses:
Expropriation/compensation;
fair and equitable treatment;
national/MFN treatment; and
performance requirements
(primarily post establishment)

Bilateral signatories

RTAs (NAFTA/EU)

Varied. NAFTA Chapter 11
resembles BIT protection but
includes entry rights.
EU guarantees right to
establishment and allows free
movement of people, services and
capital.

Regional signatories / members

GATS

Requires liberalization of trade in
services, including services
provided through FDI. Particular
concentration on financial sector.

WTO members

TRIMS

Requires elimination of trade
balancing, domestic content and
performance requirements.

WTO members

OECD Code

Encourages removal of restrictions
on capital movements.

OECD members

IMF

Requires liberalization/deregulation
of FDI and capital markets; and
privatization of state assets.

IMF debtors

The chart shows that only the norms of international customary law and the WTO
instruments have genuine range of application. Both require, however, only modest
degrees of liberalization. Customary international law on investment is still stuck in a
century-old debate as to the proper level of compensation for expropriation, and WTO
coverage of investment is patchy – catching only investment incentives and FDI through
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provision of services – and is largely voluntary, depending on country decisions to
schedule obligations.47
BITs are bilateral treaties, and so have necessarily limited coverage. They are
usually signed between developed and developing countries and exist in such numbers
that most countries are party to at least one BIT. They do not usually require broad-based
liberalization, merely preferential investment treatment. They are, however, not always
equal and do not always provide reciprocal obligations on both sides.48 In many ways
they are an asymmetrical instrument produced by heavily weighted bargaining power.49
The coverage of the remaining entries is demarcated on developmental lines. On
the one hand there are the “rich” clubs, which include the OECD, NAFTA and the EU.
Of these instruments, the OECD Code is not a binding treaty and does not require
compliance – it is more of a “best efforts” prescription. NAFTA Chapter 11 resembles a
more comprehensive BIT in terms of obligations. The EU investment regime is more
comprehensive again. Indeed, the EU takes a general exception to the OECD Code so as
to provide preferential treatment to its members. There are two important points. First,
structural reforms, such as privatization, are not called for. Second, each instrument is
exempt from the MFN discipline and benefits members only. Liberalization efforts are
reciprocated by other attractive countries.

47

An important feature of the GATS is that it operates on a “positive list” approach, which means that a
member is not bound in respect of any service sector unless it has listed this sector in a schedule. Even
once a sector is listed, exceptions can also be taken against specific GATS requirements.
48
WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 127 (2003).
49
Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties Which Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, VA. J. INT’L L. 639 (1998).
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On the other hand there is IMF conditionality which, since 1977,50 has applied
exclusively to developing countries. The degree of liberalization the IMF formula seeks
goes beyond that required by any of the other regulatory instruments – especially with its
focus on privatization – but without securing any reciprocal benefits for the IMF debtor.
This simple comparison illustrates that there is an asymmetry between how rich
and poor countries are encouraged to liberalize their investment policies, and who
benefits from the advances that have been made. Despite the rhetoric of global economic
liberalization, the biggest cooperative advances have been made only within the smallest,
and wealthiest, groups. This is the so-called bicycle approach,51 which famously
bypasses less attractive countries.
The IMF cannot correct this asymmetry, which is a harsh geo-political reality.
But it should be careful not exacerbate it. Arguably IMF conditionality prevents IMF
debtors from being able to join multilateral systems by bargaining their barriers down.
The IMF would likely argue that it is only through capital account liberalization that a
country can achieve the sort of growth which would make it an attractive treaty partner.
But this argument does not hold up. BITs are clear examples that developed countries
see benefits in open investment access to developing countries – and are keen to exploit
that advantage through their superior bargaining power.
But the bargaining power of developing countries to press for further or better
BITs, for regional agreements with developed countries (a US-African or US-Asian Free
Trade Agreement), or a resurrected MAI on more balanced terms, dilutes even further if
50
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they are required to liberalize using IMF conditionality. A wealthy country will not
compromise to gain something it can already get for free. So, even if conditionality were
an otherwise unobjectionable way of regulating investment, its inherent asymmetry is
troubling.
Conditionality is also haphazard. Goldstein has recently undertaken a study into
the amount and types of IMF structural conditionality terms, which found that a typical
one-year SBA program would include between 9 and 15 structural conditions and a
typical three-year EFF program over fifty.52 Of all conditions imposed on transition
economies, 17 percent related to restructuring and privatization and 15 percent to
financial sector reform.53 Other conditions concerned public sector management, trade,
agriculture, social security and energy reform. Such regulation seems arbitrary in
comparison to the carefully crafted obligations which apply in the developed world,
courtesy of the OECD, NAFTA and the EU.
There are other options. Most countries appreciate the importance of foreign
investment and are moving towards unilateral liberalization. The IMF can constructively
provide countries with technical advice and assistance to undertake these reforms, quite
apart from financial support.54 Treaties are another avenue. The WTO illustrates that a
multilateral system of economic concessions is possible, even with disparate country
participation. The IMF could encourage countries to join existing international treaties –
and perhaps pressure treaty bodies such as the OECD to accept wider membership for
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specific Codes – rather than requiring unilateral reform. The IMF could also play a
policy role in suggesting templates for possible treaties and advising drafters.
B.

The Legality of IMF Investment Regulation through Conditionality
(1)

New IMF Conditionality Guidelines

As a response to criticism such as that from Goldstein, the IMF’s 2002
Conditionality Guidelines are intended to signal a new, back to basics, approach. To this
end, they make reference to concepts such as “parsimony” in the choice and amount of
conditions and the need for country “ownership” of reforms. The Guidelines provide that
programs should be directed primarily towards the twin goals of solving a member’s
balance of payment problems, and “achieving medium-term external viability while
fostering sustainable growth”.55 Conditions should be imposed only if they are of
“critical importance” in achieving these goals, in monitoring progress, or in
implementing the IMF Articles “or specific policies adopted under them”. In general,
“all variables and measures that meet these criteria will be established as conditions”.56
Guideline 7(b) sets specific criteria. Conditions will “normally” consist of
macroeconomic variables and structural measures that fall within the IMF’s “core areas
of responsibility” – defined as “macroeconomic stabilization; monetary, fiscal and
exchange rate policies, including the underlying institutional arrangements and closely
related structural measures; and financial system issues related to the functioning of both
domestic and financial markets”.57 This last clause could possibly include investment
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measures. At any rate, the IMF may impose conditions outside of its core areas; but this
“may require more detailed explanation of their critical importance”.
Taken as a whole, the Guidelines appear to impose an administrative rather than a
jurisdictional fetter on the IMF. Moreover, they are not very dissimilar from the 1979
Conditionality Guidelines which provided that:58
Performance criteria will be limited to those that are necessary to
evaluate implementation of the program with a view to ensuring the achievement
of its objectives. Performance criteria will normally be confined to (i)
macroeconomic variables, and (ii) those necessary to implement specific
provisions of the Articles or policies adopted under them. Performance criteria
may relate to other variables only in exceptional cases when they are essential
for the effectiveness of the member’s program because of their macroeconomic
impact [emphasis added].

Indeed, whereas in 1979 non-core conditions could only be imposed in
“exceptional cases”, non-core conditions today can be imposed after “more detailed
explanation of their critical importance”. So the exceptionality threshold has been
dropped. The view that the Guidelines are largely an administrative statement of intent is
strengthened by the fact that much of the rhetoric advocating parsimony and ownership
appears not in the Guidelines proper, but in an annexed Staff Statement on the “Principles
Underlying the Guidelines on Conditionality”.
It is interesting that the Guidelines do not ringfence any specific type of condition
as outside the IMF’s mandate. The concession is one as to degree (less conditions,
imposed only when necessary) rather than kind (conditions must be of types A and B but
not of types C and D). Guideline 7(b) comes closest to a jurisdictional division but is
58
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worded very modestly: “[c]onditions will normally consist of…”. Below I argue that, in
relation to investment conditions, this analysis is inconsistent with the IMF’s Articles.
(2)

Who Cares What the Law Says, Anyway?

First, however, a short explanation of why such legalism is important. Some
economists might argue that the new Guidelines show that the IMF is moving in the right
direction. This is progress and there is little to be gained in additionally determining
whether the IMF is acting within the strict text of its outdated Articles. Considering how
the functions of the IMF have evolved as the world has changed, the important questions
are not legal but practical – do its measures work?
I agree that it is important to keep analysis of the IMF grounded in an
appreciation of the varied roles it plays today and to always consider, normatively, what
it should be doing. But I disagree that a focus on the IMF’s actual mandate is
unimportant. An entity’s legal structure reveals much about its purposes and role; both as
conceived and as adapted over time. An informed debate about the powers of the IMF is
one of the most powerful ways to frame a wider discussion about its role in global
governance.
Indeed, I am surprised that there has been so little explicit legal focus in the
literature on the powers of the IMF. There have been some recent articles from within
the IMF – by Stanley Fischer, Deputy Managing Director,59 Francois Gianviti, General
Counsel60 and William Holder, Deputy General Counsel.61 But there has been very little
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S. Fisher, Capital Account Liberalization, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL
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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, id.. See also the contribution from the IMF’s former General Counsel: Joseph
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commentary from outside. A notable exception is the helpful paper by Professor Cynthia
Lichtenstein.62 Given the intense scrutiny the IMF has weathered recently, it is strange
that the question of jurisdiction has not been more prominently examined. Partly, this has
to do with the constituency of experts familiar with the IMF. To date, these experts have
largely been economists and public policy theorists. Their mission has been to critique
the operations of the IMF and suggest how they could work better.
Other comparable institutions, particularly the World Trade Organization and the
United Nations, have a more heavily “legal” constituency and are careful to avoid
charges of excessive jurisdiction. This is reflected not only in their day-to-day operations,
but also in the sort of institutional conduct which is tolerated. In the WTO, members
fight tightly pitched legal battles over the meaning of terms such as “like product” or
“least restrictive means” to determine whether a regulatory measure is WTO-consistent
or not.63 The institutional balance between the members (as legislators) and the
Appellate Body (as the judiciary) is also closely monitored.
The analogy between the IMF and the United Nations is even sharper. Both were
intended to ensure a period of peace and cooperation: the one through international
political cooperation and restrictions on the use of force; the other through international
monetary cooperation and restrictions on the use of exchange controls. But the U.N. has
always been subject to tighter legal scrutiny. Its powers to intervene in conflicts such as
Gold, International Capital Movements under the Law of the International Monetary Fund, Pamphlet
Series No. 21 (IMF, 1977).
61
William Holder, Fund Jurisdiction Over Capital Movements, 5 ILSA J. OF INT’L COMP. L. 407 (1999).
62
Cynthia Crawford Lichenstein, International Jurisdiction Over Capital Flows and the Role of the IMF:
Plus Ca Change in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY LAW: ISSUES FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM (Mario Giovanoli
ed., 2000). Unfortunately, Lichenstein decided against going “into any detail concerning the IMF’s power
to impose conditions on its lending to members that have access to its resources” (71).
63
See, e.g., the Appellate Body Report in Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh Chilled or Frozen
Beef (adopted January 10, 2001).
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Rwanda, Kosovo and Iraq are carefully vetted against the provisions of the Charter and
its operations require a large degree of legal maneuvering. Just as the United Nations is
scrupulous to avoid condemning, let alone regulating, conduct which is not prohibited by
its Charter, the IMF must be careful not to overstep the grant of power given it by
member nations in 1944.
(3)

Looking Closely at the IMF’s Articles of Agreement

My particular focus is whether the IMF has the power to prescribe investment
terms as conditions for receipt of IMF funds.64 There is some writing on the IMF’s lack
of jurisdiction over capital flows.65 It is evident that the IMF has sought, but does not yet
have, such power.66 The real issue is whether conditionality policies illegitimately
circumvent this rule. I argue that they do.
The IMF has six core purposes, set out in Article I. These are:
(i)

To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution
which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on international
monetary problems.

(ii)

To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade and to
contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of
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As far back as 1977, Joseph Gold, the IMF’s former General Counsel, wrote:
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See, supra, notes 59 through 62.
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See, Fischer, supra note 59, 2; and Holder, supra note 61. Note that the IMF Interim Committee’s
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specific purpose of the IMF. This amendment was never effected. The Fund can, however, request a
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unemployment and real income and to the development of the productive
resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy.
(iii)

To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements
among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation.

(iv)

To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect of
current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign exchange
restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade.

(v)

To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them
with the opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments
without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.

(vi)

In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of
disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members.

Purposes (i), (iii), (iv) and (vi) focus on core monetary policy: monetary
cooperation, exchange stability, unrestricted current transactions and balance of payments
equilibrium. Purpose (ii) is wider and gives the IMF a mandate to encourage
international trade, employment and economic growth. Purpose (v) deals with lending
IMF general resources and is one of the textual pillars of IMF conditionality. The
restriction to general resources should be noted. As explained below, the Articles
provide a framework for lending under the General Resources Account (“GRA”) only –
that is SBA and EFF facilities. Lending outside the GRA, which includes the PGRF
facility, is dealt with by the solitary Article V(2)(b):
If requested, the Fund may decide to perform financial and technical services, including
the administration of resources contributed by members, that are consistent with the
purposes of the Fund….
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This means that the conditionality (and all other) rules for the PGRF are entirely
administrative in nature and are subject only to the limitation that they be consistent with
the IMF’s purposes.
Lending under the GRA is further clarified by Article V(3) which elaborates on
purpose (v). Article V(3)(a) provides that the Fund shall adopt policies on the use of its
general resources, including policies on stand-by or similar arrangements “that will assist
members to solve their balance of payments problems in a manner consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement and that will establish adequate safeguards for the
temporary use of the general resources of the Fund”.
Article V(3)(b) sets the conditions for members’ access to the GRA. It provides
that a member is “entitled” to make a purchase (drawing) from the Fund under the
following conditions, of which (iii) and (iv) can be waived:
(i)

the member’s use of the general resources of the Fund would be in accordance
with the provisions of this Agreement and the policies adopted under them;

(ii)

the member represents that it has a need to make the purchase because of its
balance of payments or its reserve position or developments in its reserves;

(iii)

the proposed purchase would be a reserve tranche purchase, or would not cause
the Fund’s holdings of the purchasing member’s currency to exceed two hundred
percent of its quota;

(iv)

the Fund has not previously declared under Section 5 of this Article, Article IV,
Section 1, of Article XXVI, Section 2(a) that the member desiring to purchase is
ineligible to use the general resources of the Fund.

Reading section 3(b) one might conclude that, provided the four conditions are
satisfied, a member is “entitled” draw on the GRA. This is not how the IMF has
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interpreted the Articles.67 Through extensive use of conditionality policies, the IMF has
effectively removed any sense of entitlement to draw beyond the reserve tranche.68 As
might be expected, most debate now centers on the meaning of “adequate safeguards” in
Article I(v)/Article V(3)(a). This phrase clearly gives the IMF the right to require some
conditions for the use of IMF credit. The usual view is that the IMF’s power to
determine the detail of the conditions is extremely broad. Sir Joseph Gold has written:69
The concept of conditionality has never been defined by the Articles or
codified, beyond a few broad principles, by decisions of the Fund. The absence
of a detailed code has enabled the Fund to develop and modify conditionality, as
well as the form and content of stand-by and extended arrangements, to accord
with changes in the world economy and with the special circumstances of
individual members or classes of members.

There must be some limits however. For starters, the phrase “adequate
safeguards” implies that conditions should be directed at ensuring repayment, not at an
exogenous reform agenda. This is so even if “adequate safeguards” is read in the context
of Article I(v)’s reference to preventing resort to destructive measures. Secondly, the
concept that a member is entitled to purchase cannot be entirely undermined by
restrictive conditions. Such an interpretation would be mischievous. Further, implicit in
the proviso to Article I, in Article V(3)(b)(i) – and in the very notion of the rule of law –
is the concept that the IMF’s own policies must be in accordance with the Articles.70
67
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This conclusion is spelled out in relation to non-GRA lending, which must be “consistent
with the purposes of the Fund”.
My thesis drives off this last point, and is that IMF investment regulation is
inconsistent with the IMF Articles. This is because the IMF Articles remand capital
transfers to member control. Article VI(3) provides that “[m]embers may exercise such
controls as are necessary to regulate international capital movements…”. This is in direct
contrast to the rule in Article VIII(2)(a) that “…no member shall, without the approval of
the Fund, impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current
international transactions”. The combination of these two rules is at the heart of the
IMF’s jurisdiction: the IMF has authority to regulate current transactions,71 but not
capital account movements.72
(4)

The Two Key Questions

There are then two questions to answer. First, what types of policies concern
capital account movements? Secondly, does it follow that an IMF conditionality policy
concerning capital account movements, whether under the GRA or not, is illegal?
As to the first question, Article XXX provides that:
(d)

Payments for current transactions means payments which are not for the purpose
of transferring capital, and includes, without limitation:
(1) all payments due in connection with foreign trade, other current business,
including services, and normal short-term banking and credit facilities;
(2) payments due as interest on loans and as net income from other investments;
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(3) payments of moderate amount for amortization of loans or for depreciation of
direct investments;
(4) moderate remittances for family living expenses.

In essence, this provides that a payment is on current account if the underlying
transaction for which the foreign currency is bought or sold involves good or services for
which the prompt payment is made between a resident of the country concerned and a
non-resident.73 Paragraphs (2) and (3) give the IMF some limited jurisdiction over the
proceeds of an investment, and also connected payments for interest and amortization
purposes. But, these aside, payments on capital account are outside the bound of the IMF.
Reasoning both from commonsense and by exclusion from Article XXX(d), capital
payments include: (a) direct payments to establish or acquire a foreign business (FDI);
and (b) payments to acquire foreign securities, including shares, bonds, stocks and other
chattel paper (portfolio investment).
To see, then, what policies might fall within Article VI(3), we need to examine
the relationship between the underlying transaction and the payments made in support of
that transaction. In actual fact, the line between the transaction and the transfer payment
is wafer thin.74 A paper written by IMF economists helpfully divides capital controls into
two categories: direct and indirect.75 Direct controls regulate the underlying transaction
and include prohibition of the investment; approval criteria for the payment; or conditions
restricting types of investment (such as minimum stay requirements). Indirect controls
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regulate the transfer and include taxes (such as a Tobin Tax) on foreign exchange
transactions; reserve requirements for foreign exchange transactions; or dual exchange
rates with a higher rate applying to foreign exchange transactions.
Both direct and indirect controls are discriminatory in that they treat foreign
payments differently from national payments, even if the underlying transaction is the
same. Direct controls, in addition, restrict the circumstances of the underlying
transaction. Accordingly, both direct and indirect capital controls are inconsistent with
the investment liberalization formula.76 Because the formula would promote free entry
rights and prohibit discriminatory treatment, a country which followed the formula would
relinquish the unfettered right to control capital movements.
What about privatization? This is not obviously outside the scope of the IMF’s
powers. Merely requiring that certain assets are transferred to the private sector does not,
of itself, interfere with members’ rights to regulate capital transactions. However, much
of the framework for a privatization scheme might do. A debtor country which privatized
using non-discriminatory open auctions could not simultaneously maintain restrictions
that would bar a foreigner’s success.77 The same applies to schemes which either require
the participation of foreigners, or require that shares or vouchers initially distributed to
nationals be transferable to foreigners.
Turning to question two, does it follow that the IMF cannot make the formula a
condition of funding? Gold would argue it does not follow because IMF conditionality
does not impose a legal obligation. The very concept of an SBA (or EFF and PGRF
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arrangements) is that it is not a contract and there is no legal consequence of breach.78
IMF conditionality is simply a mechanism of influence. Gold writes:79
The practice of the IMF must be taken to have affirmed the interpretation
that as performance criteria [imposed through conditionality policies] are not
obligations under the Articles or under a treaty or contract, they can include
matters over which the IMF has no regulatory jurisdiction if they have a bearing
on the balance of payments and on the purposes of the IMF.

Gold would further argue that capital flows do bear on the balance of payments
and are now within the purposes of the IMF, even though Article I does not refer to them.
Gold notes that when the Articles were amended for the second time, Article IV(1),
which is entitled “Obligations Regarding Exchange Arrangements”, was redrafted to
begin:80
Recognizing that the essential purpose of the international monetary
system is to provide a framework that facilitates the exchange of goods, services
and capital among countries, and that sustains sound economic
growth…[emphasis added]

On the basis of this argument, Lichtenstein has tentatively concluded that:81
It would seem to be appropriate for the IMF in setting a programme for a
country utilizing its resources to include a requirement of removal of capital
controls if in the circumstances of the country such liberalization will lead, in the
IMF’s view, to a return to external balance and an ability to repay the resources
borrowed.
78
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Following the Asian financial crisis, it is certainly arguable that capital
movements are sufficiently related to the international monetary system to give the IMF a
legitimate interest in their operation. But a legitimate interest does not equate to a power
to regulate. I disagree with Gold and Lichtenstein’s argument, which seeks to use a
declaratory phrase in Article IV(1) to eviscerate the clear operational division between
capital and current transactions.
(a)

A domestic law analogy – the U.S. spending clause

The United States case law on the spending clause – noted earlier – may be
helpful for sharpening analysis of essentially the same issue under the IMF Articles.
Relatively early case law resolved an ancient debate between two framers of the U.S.
Constitution, Madison and Hamilton, over whether the spending clause, which permitted
Congress to tax (and, implicitly, apportion) for the “general Welfare” of the Union,82 was
wider in scope than Congress’ specifically enumerated powers.83 The Court decided
Hamilton was correct in arguing that the spending power was indeed wider.84 A key
reason was thatth e words “general Welfare” would otherwise be redundant.85 This view
has been stoutly affirmed. Relevantly, the leading case, South Dakota v. Dole, held that
the spending power could prescribe conditions relating to liquor licensing, a matter which
is explicitly remanded to states by the Twenty-first Amendment.86
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Of course, there are some limitations to the use of the spending power.87
Conditions must be: (a) imposed in pursuit of general welfare; (b) unambiguously
expressed; (c) related to the federal program; (d) otherwise consistent with the
Constitution; and (e) not so coercive so as to compel, rather than influence, the result
sought. Many commentators have, however, criticized these conditions as being
ineffective. Each condition is routinely satisfied and the Courts are especially wary of
condition (e).88 It is widely understood that, through generous interpretation of the
spending clause, the Courts have permitted Congress to indirectly control that which it
cannot regulate directly.89
(5)

Why IMF Conditionality Cannot Include Investment Measures

If the U.S. approach were applied to the IMF Articles – especially the reasoning
in Dole – it is arguable that the IMF would have the power to include investment
liberalization measures through fund conditions. I argue that this would be the wrong
result for two reasons.
First, the IMF Articles are worded differently from the U.S. Constitution. The
implication that the general spending power exceeded the enumerated powers was based
on the argument that, otherwise, the phrase “general Welfare” would add nothing to the
Constitution. This argument cannot be made vis-à-vis the IMF. The Articles provide that
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a member seeking to draw on general funds must provide“adequate safeguards”. 90 The
pertinent concern is not that “adequate safeguards” wouldbe rendered r edundant if this
phrase excluded capital movements. The real concern is the contrary: that this phrase
could be inflated so as to include the only matter which is expressly withdrawn from the
jurisdiction of the IMF. Unlike the case of the spending clause, there is no reason to
adopt this perverse interpretation. If it is adopted, the IMF is simply enforcing through
the backdoor what it cannot require directly.91
The only lever for such an overbroad interpretation of “adequate safeguards” is
the reference to capital in Article IV(1). However, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties92 supports the view that Article IV(1) does not dilute Article VI(3).
As Gold has himself acknowledged, Article IV(1) is not written as a firm obligation, but
only as a desirable goal of the international monetary system.93 Whatever the purpose of
the reference to capital in Article IV(1), it was surely not to override the express power
over capital movements given to members by Article VI(3).94
Second, U.S. jurisprudence is informed by a naïve view that conditionality is not
necessarily regulation. The premise is that, if the state can refuse the grant, the result is a
free bargain.95 Gold’s argument is nearly identical: that conditionality does not
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“regulate” anything because it is the result of agreement. However, as Epstein has shown,
real world bargains often involve coercion; especially when there is unequal bargaining
power.96 It does not help to try to discern precisely when persuasion becomes
compulsion (it is this chimerical search which has led to an incoherent U.S. coercion test).
The flaw is the diametric opposition between bargain and coercion. Formally, there is
always a choice, even if practically there is none. A more realistic approach is to
abandon this false dichotomy. Many bargains are coerced. The essence of regulation is
not the subject’s lack of choice but the official’s aim – to alter the subject’s behavior.
Regulation by appropriation – while involving agreement, and therefore an instrument of
soft and not hard law – is regulation nonetheless.
The better view, then, is that IMF conditionality is an indirect form of regulation,
in that it requires certain conduct in exchange for funding needed to finance acute
payments deficits.97 Once this is appreciated, the clear opposition with Article VI(3) is
apparent. Members have the sole right to regulate capital transactions. Yet
conditionality policies prescribing investment liberalization also regulate capital
transactions. Therefore such IMF policies interfere with members’ autonomy. This
conclusion applies equally to GRA and non-GRA lending. In relation to both, the IMF is
regulating capital transactions – something it has no mandate to do – and thereby acting
inconsistently with the Fund’s purposes.
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Putting everything together, I argue for the following propositions:
(a)

Members have the sole right to regulate international capital movements
through capital controls.

(b)

Some controls on international capital movements prohibit, condition or
restrict the underlying transaction. All such controls discriminate against
foreign investors.

(c)

The investment liberalization formula restricts a government’s right to
control international capital movements by guaranteeing entry rights and
prohibiting discriminatory treatment (including with respect to
privatization).

(d)

IMF conditionality is a form of indirect regulation. Where it exists in an
area, the government does not have the sole right to regulate for that area.

(e)

Therefore, the IMF cannot legally condition access funds on
implementation of the investment liberalization formula.

C.

The Legitimacy of IMF Investment Regulation

Concerns about the legitimacy of IMF conditionality have been widely voiced and
the arguments are well-known. Mostly, the arguments arise out of the tension between a
state’s right to economic sovereignty98 and the IMF’s right to demand adequate
safeguards for repayment. In this section I examine some general arguments and explain
how they specifically relate to the IMF’s intervention in investment.
98

The United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (1974) provides that “Every State
has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its economic system as well as its political, social and
cultural systems in accordance with the will of its people, without outside interference, coercion or threat in
any form whatsoever”.

33

It is hard to deny the IMF’s “mission creep” since its inception. The original
intent of the IMF to temporarily lend money to all nations to support a fixed exchange
system does not sit comfortably with the IMF’s modern role of policing the adjustment of
developing countries to market economies. On one view, this mission creep is simply a
fact that must be accepted: a host of developing countries requiring balance of payments
support came into existence during the 1950s due to the retreat of the French and British
colonial powers, and during the 1990s with the fall of communism. The IMF had little
choice but to adapt to its new task.99
(1)

The IMF’s Governance Structure

Perhaps this is so, but it remains that the IMF’s new role as an apostle of
globalization lacks the neutrality of its origins. It is strange to consider it today, but the
IMF was designed to be compatible with a range of different political and economic
systems. Keynes’ idea in 1944 was not that all countries would turn into free-market
democracies, but that each country could abide by certain rules relating to current
transactions and exchange rates. The IMF was to police those rules. By becoming an
architect of reform the IMF necessarily aligns with Western developed countries and
seeks to impose their political and economic values on debtor countries.
The most serious problem caused by the IMF’s ideological bent concerns the
IMF’s governance design. The fact that the IMF was a technical body meant it was not
unacceptable that, unlike at the UN for instance, all representation was determined by
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economic strength.100 The IMF has a weighted voting system in which member states’
votes are held in proportion to their quota, which in turn is based on each member’s
wealth.101 For instance, the U.S. holds 17.10 percent of the total votes. In contrast, India,
Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri Lanka collectively hold 2.41 percent. Even more tellingly,
Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Eritria, Ethiopia, Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, collectively hold 3.22 percent.102 As 15 percent is
enough to veto many critical decisions, the U.S. is the only country with a unilateral veto.
The European Union, collectively, also has a veto.
The day to day affairs of the IMF are managed by its Executive Board.103 The
Managing Director who heads this Board is, by convention, a European (the head of the
World Bank is, by convention, an American). The Board presently has twenty-four
permanent directors, all of whom are elected for two year terms save the directors for the
U.S., Japan, France, Germany and the U.K.. Most countries without permanent directors
are represented collectively by proxy directors.
At present, there is a serious risk of institutional capture. By advocating
Washington Consensus policies, the IMF’s agenda comfortably aligns with neo-liberal
Western governments and with the profit motives of Western multinational companies.
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There is some evidence IMF conditionality has, in specific cases, been driven by the
wishes of G-7 countries.104 This is not surprising. Capital flows today connect the world:
both developed and developing. Forty five percent of global output comes from
developing countries, which also attract more than one third of foreign investment
inflows.105 Integrated capital markets mean that developed countries have a genuine
economic interest in influencing the investment regimes of the developing world. The
IMF’s governance structure makes this only too possible.
This leads back to the problem of asymmetry.106 The IMF’s shift in focus has
effectively transferred regulatory power from the developing to the developed world,
thereby exacerbating an already unequal situation. Whereas rich countries control their
own economies, poor countries are gradually ceding such control to international
financial institutions, especially the IMF. As stated, since 1977 no developed country has
applied for an IMF loan and therefore been subject to IMF conditionality.107 In contrast,
the need of developing countries for long-term balance of payments support has grown
considerably.
This asymmetry contributes to the growing inequality in global finance.
Countries at the centre of the global economic system are able to lend and receive loans
in their own currency (e.g., the U.S., Europe, Japan). Countries at the periphery have to
borrow in the currencies of the major players and are subject to the increased financial
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pressures this entails. IMF conditionality is intricately involved in this process because
the IMF is a credit flagship for the private sector. If the IMF won’t lend, nobody else
(including the World Bank) will lend not invest.108 Should the IMF suddenly call in a
loan or refuse to release the next tranche, private lenders and foreign investors presently
operating in the country will likely pull out also, triggering a financial collapse. So a
poor country needing credit often has no realistic choice but to accept IMF conditionality.
The IMF is not just one lender amongst others. It is the leader.
(2)

Conceptual Problems of Conditionality

As described above, conditionality is a difficult regulatory concept. To
understand it, one must understand the complex relationship between the IMF and a
debtor country. The two do not stand in definite opposition. Often the country wishes to
reform and the IMF provides the technical guidance to help the reform to succeed.
Nevertheless, there is something about regulation through conditionality which poisons
the outcome.
One way to try to understand the concept of conditionality is using Max Weber’s
theory about the effect of power on behavior.109 Weber argued that power exists in an
infinite variety of forms – legal, economic, social. Economic power typically involves
domination through a “constellation of interests” (i.e., two parties act to further their own
self-interests, but these intersect in such a way that party A gains some control over party
B’s conduct: e.g., a standard bank loan). This can, however, gradually transform to
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domination through “authority” (i.e., B comes to obey A’s commands as if the command
was intrinsically binding). It is interesting to consider the relationship of Weber’s
“obedience” and the IMF’s concept of “ownership”.
There is already literature on the latter term. Some tends to suggest that country
ownership can be attained simply by the IMF focusing more strongly on this goal.110
Other commentators recognize the complexity of the concept – “ownership” must be
defined, even then it is not observable, and there are multiple dynamic actors – but
conclude that it is achievable in practice through the right conditionality policies.111 It
may be the case, however, thatconditionality inherently precludes country ownership. If
the country does not become obedient (accepts IMF policies as inherently wise), its
reforms may be little more than paper laws. Real reform requires commitment and
grassroots institutional change. But if the country does become obedient, then there is a
problem of political power transfer to the IMF. The IMF’s continued contact and
surveillance over the country then assumes greater influence. Who “owns” the policy in
this scenario? The risk is that the IMF’s role comes to subvert the political process.
Why, one might ask, can the relationship not be characterized as a debtor country
properly relying on a body with genuine expertise in reform? In short, for the same
reason why relationships between doctors and patients are inherently one-sided. The
power imbalance prevents a true partnership, or the patient “owning” advice provided by
the doctor.
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One might argue that the obvious regulatory alternative – treaty obligation – is not
much different as developing countries often have little choice but to sign on to a package
deal of new international rules. The WTO might be a case in point. This perspective has
some truth but should not be pushed too far. Developing countries do play roles in
negotiating treaties, as the Doha Round attests. It is more conceivable that a struggling
developing country would not sign a new investment treaty than it is that such a country
would refuse IMF funding. Most importantly, however, treaties are reciprocal. Instead
of being a debtor subject to the demands of the IMF, the developing country is a
signatory, equal in status and bound to the same set of rules as all other signatories.
(3)

Conditionality and Democracy

A core problem with conditionality, then, is that it is not conducive to healthy
democracy. Issues that would usually be at the centre of democratic debate are simply
removed from the table. A country reliant on the IMF is bound to follow certain paths in
relation to many of the most pressing issues concerning its population: taxes, foreign
investment, social welfare, land distribution, privatization. This means that, no matter
which party is in power, the agenda on important points is fixed.
This leads to elections being trivialized through candidates campaigning not on
serious policy differences but on minor or personality issues. The election of Lula in
Brazil is a recent counterexample, but the Western outcry which greeted his election
shows the pressure IMF conditionality can place on developing countries.112 Many
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incipient democracies do not have serious choices of different candidates or the economic
power to reject the IMF’s preferred candidate.
Conditionality can also contribute to darker problems, such as corruption.
Conditioned policies naturally dilute accountability on the part of both domestic
politicians and IMF officials. This point has been recognized in the U.S. spending clause
jurisprudence.113 If policies do not work out, it is always possible for the domestic
politicians to blame the IMF, and vice versa.114 This attribution of blame is sometimes
unfair and is usually unproductive. In some cases the lack of clear accountability lines
permits corrupt or inefficient politicians to escape public scrutiny and censure.
Developing countries are developing in every sense of the word. Their economic
institutions are developing, and their political structures are often fledgling democracies.
A recent study has shown that new democracies are inherently fragile and often do not
last long.115 One might argue that, by requiring a range of fixed measures held in place
by external mechanisms, the IMF is financing economic reforms with political capital.
The result might be that the reforms fail, not because they were the wrong medicine, but
because they fractured the incipient democracy and plunged the country into chaos.
This is especially a risk for foreign investment reforms. One unfortunate side
effect of investment liberalization is that wealthy and influential foreigners may come to
Election”, The Economist, October 3, 2002 (“Good for Latin American Democracy. How Good for
Brazil?”), available at
<http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displayStory.cfm?story_ID=1365282&subject=SA
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have firm political views, which find influence outside the political process. This can be
problematic in mature democracies. But, especially if associated with crony capitalism, it
can be devastating for fragile democracies. As Amy Chua has argued, foreign investment
can be uniquely destabilizing.116 Chua’s thesis concerning the cyclical nature of
privatization and nationalization movements in Latin America and South East Asia is a
provocative illustration of the political consequences of investment reform. Chua argues
that:117
Subverting or abolishing foreign ownership restrictions, although
potentially lucrative in the near term, is a shortsighted strategy. These laws were
enacted for a reason and should not be done away with casually.

Perhaps this thesis can be taken a step further. Chua argues that liberalization of
investment markets and privatization of state assets can destabilize already fragile
developing countries, leading to revolution and reversal of reforms. Arguably, the
problem is exacerbated if the legitimacy of the reforms is questioned from the outset.
Even if pursued unilaterally, the investment liberalization formula is risky.
Conditionality simply raises the ante.
D.

The Effectiveness of IMF Investment Regulation

For foreign investment reforms, as for many things, the devil is in the detail.
Some reforms have worked very well; others have turned out very badly. Scholars are
still learning about the transposability of legal rules between different cultures and
environments. What is becoming clear is that formal rules do not work without the
institutions and cultural knowledge to support them. While the IMF’s focus is on
116
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macroeconomic policy, arguably the difference between success and failure lies in the
intricate grassroots decisions which require local knowledge. There is unlikely to be any
“off the rack” policy which will work for every nation. The IMF has been accused by
many prominent economists of pursuing policies which lack the finesse and detail
required.118 If this is true, the IMF is not to blame. It is hard to design successful reform
through macroeconomic variables alone. Nevertheless, if the design of foreign
investment regimes is heavily influenced by the IMF, legitimate questions can be asked
about likely success rates.
This is not an academic concern. There are huge risks in mismanagement.
Investment flows are more volatile in developing than in developed countries.119 Capital
market liberalization had tragic consequences for the Asian Tigers. Privatization of water
supply was not successful in Bolivia. Foreign direct investment in Nigeria’s oil reserves
has not greatly benefited its country’s citizens. Foreign investment liberalization can hurt
an emergent economy as well as help it.
Moreover, as Russian privatization has shown, the political will for extensive
reforms is not inexhaustible. It is important to get reforms right the first time around.
Getting an investment climate right is harder than simply deregulating capital inflows.
Other factors, such as good governance, the rule of law, competition rules, clear property
rights, are also required.120 Arguably both unilateral reform (with proper advice), or a
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treaty model, are better than reforms urged through conditionality, because they are more
likely to attract the necessary political will.
The most damning effectiveness problem, though, is that IMF conditionality
programs are too short.121 SBAs last for eighteen months and EFF facility loans for three
years. The PGRF facility, which is directed to structural reform, is also only three years
with a possible one year extension. Given the decades, and sometimes centuries,
developed countries took to become open market economies, these timeframes seem
extremely ambitious. A palpable risk is that, in order to complete the reform cycle – and
be repaid the money it loaned – the IMF is tempted to roll-over loans and effectively lend
money to a country to pay itself back with. This ties uncomfortably back into Weber’s
theory of power. The IMF’s mandate for “temporary” assistance simply does not lend it
to structural reforms.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Few now debate the economic benefits of foreign investment. The important

question is the framework, and the rules, under which this should take place. At present
these rules are piecemeal. This article has argued that IMF conditionality is a flawed
regulatory tool and should not be permitted to entrench itself as part of a new investment
framework.
A number of long-term investment frameworks are possible but none are closely
on the horizon. One proposal would be for the IMF to continue its sophisticated technical
assistance programs to countries seeking to liberalize investment, but not make
participation a condition of finance. Another would be the negotiation of a new MAI
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balanced to address the many contested issues for both developed and developing
countries. Until either event happens, however, the IMF should not further distort
international investment regulation in the name of trying to simply achieve what it can.
Sometimes the cure is worse than the disease.
As a final thought, the case of investment underscores how important it is that the
role of the IMF be loudly and widely debated – and then reflected clearly in its Articles.
More than anything, the Achilles heel of the IMF is the widening chasm between its legal
and its actual roles. An important step forward for the IMF is to adopt a transparent set
of responsibilities which are endorsed by its members. For this, it may be that a complete
redraft, rather than an amendment, of the IMF’s Articles might be in order.
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